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Introduction 
Zen Buddhism has long been an elusive and overlooked subject in the realm of Western 
Philosophy. The main reason is that most original Zen texts are written in Ancient Chinese and 
Zen researchers in China are mostly not philosophy professionals who have gone through 
training in the system of Western Philosophy. So most of the texts explaining Zen Buddhism are 
not written in an analytical style. Also, there is a lack of Western epistemologists who are 
interested in Zen Buddhism. Most of the Western researchers in Zen are those who focus on the 
religious aspects.  
The purpose of this thesis is to provide some initial thoughts on how to explain Zen 
Buddhist epistemology in the context of Western epistemology, especially Wittgenstein’s 
epistemology. I come to find that there are many similarities between Zen and Wittgenstein’s 
texts and Wittgenstein’s explanation can open a door for people who are trying to understand 
Zen Buddhism.  
To begin, I am going to explain some terms that are unfamiliar in the system of Western 
Epistemology.  
In the second part of the thesis, I am going to introduce a famous Zen Story about the 
three stages to get enlightenment, which is the final goal of most people practicing Zen. After 
having an explanation from a Chinese Zen researcher, I am going to look into two similar three-
stage structure in Wittgenstein’s famous work: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. We are going to 
see that there are some astonishing similarities between the ideas they are trying to express: they 
both involve the idea that if you look closely into solipsism, in the end, you are going to find that 
you will become a realist. They also have the idea that the final enlightenment or the ultimate 
truth is not something that you can achieve by gathering more and more knowledge and 
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experience. It is something that is going to be achieved through a process that is unspeakable. 
In the third part of the thesis, I am going to explain more about what Zen and 
Wittgenstein mean when they say about a process that is unspeakable, or in another word, 
epiphany. I will first quote The Diamond Sutra and its explanation of the epiphany process in 
Zen Buddhism. I will then introduce Wittgenstein’s idea about why understanding that cannot be 
expressed by thoughts is possible. Then I am going to try to answer two questions that might 
raise concerns from a Western epistemological view, which are “How do you know you 
achieved epiphany?” and “How do you know you got the truth from an epiphany process?”. 
In the final section of the thesis, I will give a conclusion and summary of the result of the 
paper and propose some lines of inquiry of possible future research.  
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Term definition 
 
Dao:  
The ultimate truth that Zen is pursuing. It is a direct translation from the Chinese 
Character “道.” The Chinese Character has many meanings in different kinds of religion. 
However, in this thesis, we are going to discuss the idea of Dao in a Zen Buddhist sense. It is 
hard to explain what the Dao is. However, we are going to have a concrete idea about Dao after 
the second section of the thesis.  
What is also worth mentioning is that getting the Dao or achieving Enlightenment is 
explaining the same thing since in Chinese they are written the same: “悟道.” The first 
character means suddenly getting some knowledge or just enlightenment and the second 
character is just Dao. It is said that getting the Dao is the ultimate goal of people practicing Zen 
and people reaching that stage will be rid of worry and sorrow and achieved Nirvana.  
 
Zen:  
Or Ch’an. The Ch’an is an indigenous form of Chinese Buddhism and Ch’an is directly 
translated from Chinese “禅.” Ch’an later spread to Japan and became “Zen.”i 
 
Epiphany:  
Epiphany is a process that enables one to achieve Dao. The word in Chinese can be 
understood as “Sudden Realization,” so it is supposed to be a process when one suddenly 
recognized the Dao by intuition, rather than logic and deduction. 
The epiphany process serves as the primary way for realization in Zen Buddhism. The 
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idea was brought up by The Sixth Patriarch, who is one of the most famous Chinese Buddha 
masters and is often considered as one of the early founders of Zen Buddhism. Then the idea 
became so renowned that Zen Buddhism and the epiphany process became the central Chinese 
Buddhism. Zen Buddhism is then brought to Japan and later, America.  
Epiphany in Japanese is translated as Satori.ii 
 
Koan:  
“Enigmatic and often shocking spiritual expressions based on dialogical encounters 
between masters and disciples that were used as pedagogical tools for religious training in the 
Zen Buddhist tradition.”iii  
Koans generally have the form that Zen masters are trying to help their students get 
enlightenment by telling a story, making a metaphor or just performing a weird act.  
 
Dualism:  
Dualism has many meanings in western philosophy. However, in this paper, I am going 
to use “dualism” to refer to some separation or contradiction between two things.  
 
Concept: 
I will use the word “concepts” to mean Fregean’s senses. A sense of a subsentential 
expression is a concept. Concepts are not mental objects, according to Fregean, but instead 
abstract objects. The reason that they are not mental objects is that more than one mind can grasp 
the same concept, or think the same thought.iv 
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Solipsism: 
I am using “Solipsism” as the idea that “‘existence’ means for me my existence and that 
of my mental states. Existence is everything that I experience -- physical objects, other people, 
events and processes -- anything that would commonly be regarded as a constituent of the space 
and time in which I coexist with others and is necessarily construed by me as part of the content 
of my consciousness.” v 
 
Realism: 
I am using “Realism” as the idea that the existence of objects and their properties are 
independent of anyone’s beliefs, linguistic practices, conceptual schemes and so on. vi 
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Section one: On Zen and Wittgenstein’s three stages to achieve 
the ultimate truth 
 
Thirty years ago, before I practiced Ch’an, I saw that mountains are mountains and 
rivers are rivers. However, after having achieved intimate knowledge and having gotten 
a way in, I saw that mountains are not mountains and rivers are not rivers. But now that I 
have found rest, as before I see mountains are mountains and rivers are just rivers. vii 
 
The aphorism occurs in many variants in Ch’an or Zen literature but is first attributed to 
Master Qingyuan in the Compendium of the Five Lamps. The Zen Master is indicating that 
having the epiphany, achieving Dao, or getting enlightenment (which are all the same thing in 
Chinese as mentioned in the term definition part of the paper) has three stages: 
 
Mountains are mountains. 
Mountains are not mountains. 
Mountains are just mountains. 
 
However, like other Zen texts, it is still quite hard to understand. What is happening 
between the three stages? What is the difference between the first stage and the third stage? 
People studying Zen Buddhism gives an explanation of the three stages, which I am going into 
the detail in the next section. What I want to mention here is that I found that there are some 
shocking similarities about the three stages in Wittgenstein’s writing, mainly in the Tractatus 
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Logico-Philosophicus and Blue and Brown Books. I will make some analysis in Wittgenstein’s 
three stages and make a comparison between Wittgenstein and Zen Buddhist texts. 
 
A Zen explanation: 
This explanation is given in a paper published in 1991 called “Same or different?” and 
the truth about Zen written by Qiu Shi. The original text is written in Chinese, and I am going to 
summarize and translate the text down below:  
“The first stage is “mountains are mountains and rivers are rivers.” The reason that 
mountains are mountains in the first stage is that there exists the separation of the 
mountain and I. There is some dualism in place, which is the separation of me and the 
physical world. I, as an observer, am experiencing the world, and thus mountains are 
mountains: they are physically there to me. What I mean by separation here is that there 
exist two separate things: the mountain and me, or the mountain and the river. Buddhism 
usually see this stage as the puzzling stage, which is also where most of the people are in. 
In the mountain, river and I situation, I am distorted or bothered by the separation. The 
case can also be extended to true and false, good and bad, beautiful and ugly, smart and 
dumb, life and death, etc. We can always see the conflict in the world, and because of the 
separation between the world and me, I and the world is also in conflict and thus brings 
us concerns and fear.  
Then how can we go from the first stage to the second stage? We need to “get a way in.” 
But where is the way? Qiu Shi thinks that the way is to understand that there is no me. If 
there is no me, then there doesn't exist the observer, and later the mountain and the river 
will cease to exist and also the conflict will cease to exist. The reason he thinks this is the 
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case is that Buddhism thinks that everything is changeable. There is a cause, and then 
there come the phenomena. Everything in the universe exists in cause and connections, 
and there doesn’t exist a physically object that is standing without other objects. Qiu Shi 
thinks that Qingyuan is acknowledging the non-existence of the physical world. However, 
Qiu Shi also mentioned that although there is no me, “Zi Xin” still exists, and it is the 
true essence of the world. What “Zi Xin” means in Chinese is “own-heart” or “own-
thought.” So in the second stage, there is no me, no mountain, no river, just own-thought, 
and thus mountains are not mountains and rivers are not rivers.  
So what is happening between the second stage and the third stage? Qiu Shi thinks the 
third stage is to eliminate the difference between me and no me. After we realized that 
there is no difference between the mountain and the river, the mountain and me, there 
still exists a difference between the statement that there is a separation, and there doesn't 
exist a separation. We are going to do something like anti-no-separation or anti-no-
difference since the second stage is about no separation and no difference and the third 
stage is to anti that. The ultimate outcome is achieved by eliminating the difference 
between the statement that there is a difference, and there is no difference. And this time, 
we can see mountains are still mountains, and rivers are just rivers. However, the 
mountains do not exist because of me as the observer see it exists, I am right now 
acknowledging the true existence of the mountain and the river. The difference from the 
first stage is that this time I am seeing the true entity of the mountain, not the mountain I 
see as the observer.” viii 
 
The first stage is pretty easy to understand in Qiu Shi’s explanation, which is the state of 
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a normal person. A person sees the world through the eyes and can see mountains are just 
mountains and think they are physically there because they think they see it. 
For the second stage, because Qiu Shi thinks that Buddhism says that everything is empty, 
which means that everything is an illusion and not physically there. So he believes that Qingyuan 
thinks that mountains are no longer mountains because they are just an illusion and not there. 
However, what is unique about this explanation is that not only the mountains and the rivers are 
illusions, but also the idea of I as the observer is also an illusion because there is no me. What is 
also distinctive is that although there is no me, there is still the idea of “own-heart” or “own-
thought” exists, which is quite hard to understand. My understanding is that he is talking about 
an idea that: as long as I am thinking, there must exist my thoughts. However, the thought 
doesn't require a thinker, so I am still an illusion, but my thoughts are real. 
Qiu Shi’s text that explains what is happening between the second stage and the third 
stage is tough to read since he didn't explain why certain things are happening. But there is 
something I do catch from the explanation of the third stage, which is the transition from the 
doctrine that everything is empty to realism. Qiu Shi thinks that in the end, the reason Qingyuan 
began to see the mountain as mountain is that he realized that the mountains are actually and 
physically there. However, one might argue that people in the first stage also think that 
mountains are there so what’s the difference. Qiu Shi’s answer to that is the reason people in the 
first stage believe that mountains are physically present there is because they are blinded and 
think that they see the actual mountain and river. However, they see the illusion of the mountain 
and the river and thought they see the truth. 
 However, after the second stage of considering the possibility that everything is an 
illusion, you sort of know that your eye and yourself are giving you fake things. So people 
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reaching the third stage can see the truth about this world, not a fake illusion anymore. We can 
relate this idea to Plato’s form. People reaching this stage is like people living in a world that has 
perfect forms. So they no longer see the imperfect imitation in the phenomenon world (in the 
Plato case) or an illusion and the changeable world (In Zen’s sense), instead, they see the 
ultimate truth of this world, and the ultimate truth is that the mountains are physically there.  
Now here comes the critical question: Why that is the case and how do we reach that? 
However, Zen Buddhism doesn’t give us answer about why (they never offer a “why” to 
anything closely related to Dao, a topic I will touch on later), however, they do give us how: 
which is to eliminate the difference between that belief that there is a difference, and there is no 
difference. It seems Zen is describing an idea that you need to make a cognitive jump to reach 
that, since in the world that there is a difference between there is a difference and there is no 
difference is in the world that still has logic. However, when you reach that there is no difference 
stage, you are stepping out of the boundary of logic since that this not logical. So you need to get 
out of the border of this world and make a jump to another. The Zen Buddhist idea I have been 
talking about is very puzzling, and my discussion of it here does not make it very clear. However, 
later on, I will return to this topic, after discussing Wittgenstein, and that then it might be easier 
to figure out what is going on here. 
 
Wittgenstein’s three stages: 
At many places in his writing, Wittgenstein puts forward an idea that seems to involve a 
similar series of three-stages, and I am going to discuss two of them. The first one is a part of the 
Tractatus, and the second one is the structure of the Tractatus as a whole. 
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5.6 The limits of my language mean the limits of my world. 
 
5.61 Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits.  
So we cannot say in logic, ‘The world has this in it, and this, but not that.’ 
For that would appear to presuppose that we were excluding certain possibilities, and 
this cannot be the case, since it would require that logic should go beyond the limits of 
the world; for only in that way could it view those limits from the other side as well.  
We cannot think what we cannot think; so what we cannot think we cannot say either. 
 
5.62 This remark provides the key to the problem, how much truth there is in solipsism. 
For what the solipsist means is quite correct; only it cannot be said, but makes itself 
manifest. 
The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that 
language which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world. 
 
5.634 This is connected with the fact that no part of our experience is at the same time a 
priori.  
Whatever we see could be other than it is. Whatever we can describe at all could be other 
than it is. There is no a priori order of things. 
 
5.64 Here it can be seen that solipsism, when its implications are followed out strictly, 
coincides with pure realism. The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, 
and there remains the reality coordinated with It. ix 
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In the text above, Wittgenstein depicted three stages from normal to solipsism and then to 
pure realism. Wittgenstein didn't mention the first stage since it is pretty self-evident: not all 
people believe in solipsism from the start.  
People moving from the first stage to the second stage through learning solipsism and 
later believe in it. Wittgenstein thinks that solipsism is quite right is because the world is my 
world. The key is the sentence: “The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits 
of language mean the limits of my world.” Wittgenstein thinks that there is a limit to our 
language and our world is just the world made of the language that we can use. Thus the world 
we see is just a world I can use language to describe and therefore it is just my world. However, 
it seems to Wittgenstein that there doesn't exist the physical world, or he thinks that solipsism 
means that the world we can see is my world and whether there is a physical world is none of my 
business. I do believe that Wittgenstein meant the latter since he did not give us a reason why the 
physical world doesn't exist. We can have the world as we can describe it, but we can still have a 
physical world lying somewhere.  
Then it comes to the third stage, which is after some further analysis, solipsism coincides 
with pure realism. I have to acknowledge that it is pretty hard for me to understand what does it 
mean by solipsism shrinks to a point and then becomes realism. I don’t have a solution to why 
Wittgenstein think that solipsism coincides with pure realism. However, we can see that 
Wittgenstein’s third stage mirrors Zen’s third stage since they all go from some strange 
metaphysically views, like solipsism to common sense, like realism.   
Here is another three-stage process in the Tractatus. If we are going to look at Tractatus 
from the whole book, we can see that the book is written in a three stages structure. 
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The readers who begin to read the book are in the first stage. Then Wittgenstein takes his 
reader to be looking for a solution to specific problems: some philosophical problems. He talked 
about logic, morality, language, will, etc. Those facts can all move us to the second stage, and we 
should have some understanding of some philosophical issues. But at the end of Tractatus, 
Wittgenstein writes: 
 
6.521 The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of the problem. 
(Is not this the reason why those who have found after a long period of doubt that the 
sense of life became clear to them have then been unable to say what constituted that 
sense?) 
 
6.53 The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing 
except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science—i.e. something that has 
nothing to do with philosophy—and then, whenever someone else wanted to say 
something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to 
certain signs in his propositions. 
Although it would not be satisfying to the other person—he would not have the feeling 
that we were teaching him philosophy—this method would be the only strictly correct one. 
 
6.54 My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who 
understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them—as 
steps—to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he 
has climbed up it.) 
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He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright. x 
 
Wittgenstein thinks that when you learn the solutions to the philosophical problems, you 
won’t be able to say what the answers are, in a sentence; the solutions must be shown, rather than 
said. And when you come to understand Wittgenstein, he says, you will learn that the problems 
themselves disappear. So, in a way, you go back to something like the way you were before you 
became aware of the problems. 
Also in both Wittgenstein and Zen, at the second stage, you come to believe something 
new which looks like a sophisticated philosophical theory, and then at the third stage, you 
recognize that that theory was somehow confused or meaningless. For Wittgenstein, all the 
sentences in the Tractatus up till the end are meaningless, and for Zen, it turns out that there was 
no difference between there being a separation and there being no separation, hence at the second 
stage you were really confused when you thought you had learned something new that you 
hadn’t known when you were at the first stage. 
 
A comparison between Wittgenstein and Zen: 
Studying Wittgenstein’s texts can help us understand Zen tremendously. Wittgenstein’s 
first three stages have astonishing similarity with Zen’s three stages: they both involve some 
solipsism idea and then return to realism. So we can use the Wittgenstein’s understanding of 
solipsism idea to learn what is happening to the second stage. So if in the second stage, what we 
are referring to as an illusion world or a fake world is just the world we see it. Then it does not 
mean that there doesn't exist a physical world. There can still exist a physical world, and just 
human being cannot perceive it. Wittgenstein also answers why we cannot see the real world, 
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which is the limits of language. 
The last part of Tractatus can help us understand the significant jump from the second 
stage to the third stage. From the second stage to the third stage requires the knowledge that is 
beyond the limits of the second stage and the knowledge is something that cannot be said 
because language is in the second stage. And that is also why you cannot tell, or no one is 
explaining what is happening from the second stage to the third stage. People began to say things 
that only includes statements, stories or sometimes show you something rather than giving you a 
reason: It is not because they do not want to. It is because they just cannot.  
Also, I noticed that all of the three processes from the second stage to the third stage 
involve the eliminating of the question itself. For the Zen explanation, the third stage needs us to 
eradicate the concept of difference and separation, which is the critical question we are going to 
solve in the second stage. For the solipsism to realism transition, in the end, we found out that 
solipsism and realism are the same things. For the last part of Tractatus, Wittgenstein directly 
says that the solution of the problem is in the vanishing the problem. So I think this is the 
ultimate reason why the third stage returned to the first stage: after eliminating the problems that 
bother us in the second stage, we are left without the problems raised in the transition between 
the first stage and the second stage, and thus we look exactly like the first stage. However, we 
are different from the first stage, since we have already gone through the second stage and we are 
no longer bothered by the problems between the first and the second stage. To Buddhism, it is 
just because of those problems that make people sad, worried and now, after reaching the third 
stage, we can become a true Zen master and be free of all the worries and sadness.  
I will end this section with a famous koan which later being transformed to different 
versions of the Zen stories. However, the essence remains: 
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A student once asked his teacher, "Master, what is enlightenment?" 
The master replied, "When hungry, eat. When tired, sleep." xi 
 
In the next section of the thesis, we are going to focus more on the jump, and the thing 
that cannot be said.  
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Section two: On the process and legitimacy of epiphany 
From the above section, we come to know that there is a cognitive jump happening 
between the second stage and the third stage. However, both Wittgenstein and Zen Buddhism 
texts from above cannot give us a detailed view about what is happening. So, in this section, we 
are going to research more on what is happening during the jump and why it is something that 
cannot be said.  
We are going to start from an ancient Zen text: The Diamond Sutra, which is one of the 
most famous and important Zen Buddhist texts.  
 
Now in the midst of the assembly was the Elder Subhuti. Forthwith, he arose from his 
seat, bared his right shoulder, knelt upon his right knee and with palms joined 
respectfully, addressed the Buddha thus. 
“Most rare World- Honored One! The Tathagata is skillfully mindful, perfectly 
instructing and entrusting the Bodhisattvas. World-Honored One, when virtuous men and 
virtuous women initiate the mind of anuttara-samyaksambodhi, how should their minds 
dwell? How should their minds be pacified?” 
The Buddha spoke, “Excellent, excellent Subhuti, it is as you say. The Tathagata is 
skillfully mindful, perfectly instructing and entrusting the Bodhisattvas. Now, listen well 
to what I say. Virtuous men and virtuous women who initiate the mind of anuttara-
samyaksambodhi should thus dwell and pacify their minds.” 
“I assure you, World-Honored One, we joyfully await your answer.”xii 
 
The above text depicted a question-answer situation in The Diamond Sutra. To fully 
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understand this, we have to get the full story here, which is explained by Master Nan Huai-Chin: 
 
The Buddha said, when virtuous men and virtuous women decide to seek the supreme 
Dao, it’s like THIS that their minds should dwell, like THIS that they should pacify their 
minds. After finishing this sentence, the World-Honored One then once again closed his 
eyes. Subhuti probably waited for ages and then raised his head to look. He said, “I 
assure you, World-Honored One, we joyfully await your answer.” 
In other words, I’m on the edge of my seat listening, waiting to hear! Subhuti was just 
poised there, but the Buddha did not continue. Why? Because he had already answered, 
but Subhuti did not understand.”xiii 
 
I believe that we all share Subhuti’s confusion. How is repeating the question an answer? 
Nan Huai-Chin also gave us an answer for that, “He (Buddha) was telling Subhuti to listen 
carefully. Listen very carefully, and I’ll tell you. When you have the mind, when all of your 
mind is just one thought that seeks the Dao, just like this should it rest. Just like this has the 
untamed mind been placated. That’s all—just like that.”xiv 
According to Nan Huai-Chin, the reason that the Buddha answered the question in this 
way is that he wanted Subhuti to achieve epiphany by showing him that what he was doing right 
now is the answer to his question. The key here is to show, not to tell. Zen masters have the idea 
that the best way to teach Dao is to show it in some form and the student will realize it by the 
action, not the words. 
And we can also find a similar idea in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 
which we have analyzed in the above section: 
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6.53 The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing 
except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science— i.e. something that has 
nothing to do with philosophy— and then, whenever someone else wanted to say 
something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to 
certain signs in his propositions. Although it would not be satisfying to the other 
person— he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy— this 
method would be the only strictly correct one. 
 
7 What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.xv 
 
From the above text, we can see clearly that for Wittgenstein, there is something that can 
be said and something that cannot be said. The “sayable” things are propositions of natural 
science, the “unsayable” things are the things that are outside of natural science, and the role of 
philosophy is telling people that the thing that they are seeking is “unsayable.” 
We can soon find the connections by directly comparing Zen Buddhism text with 
Tractatus: it seems that Wittgenstein is depicting philosophers as Zen masters: someone who 
tells people to realize the truth, not through words and someone who pass over the truth in 
silence.  
 
A further breakdown of the third stage: 
 
For Zen masters, the purpose of epiphany is mainly to achieve Dao or to achieve the third 
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stage. Like we discussed before, Zen didn't give a reason why practicing Zen can enable you to 
get the epiphany. However, we can find some text about the characteristics of the epiphany 
process. Nan Huai-Chin puts it this way: 
 
True form is the essential substance of Dao, or dharmakaya, and is exactly the true 
essence of enlightenment. It is the Dao to which one awakens. And just what is this Dao? 
Is it found in emptiness or in phenomena? That which is called true form is just the 
dharmakaya, the original source of being… The idea is to find the original source of 
being and diligently pursue the fountainhead of the universe, the original form of the 
dharmakaya. Enlightenment is awakening to the dharmakaya. In Buddhist terminology, 
enlightenment is awakening to the empty nature of the dharmakaya. This is what’s called 
true form prajna. It is wisdom as opposed to mere intelligence, which is conceptual in 
nature. Intelligence is limited to previous knowledge, experience, feelings or images; 
whereas, the true dharmakaya is inconceivable. 
Those who study the sutras will often encounter the expression inconceivable, and 
through the literati, this expression has been brought into common usage… Its original 
meaning was exclusively used to describe a method of realizing the dharmakaya. We 
can’t reach it through common knowledge or ideas, or through thinking about it, 
discussing it or researching it; therefore, it is termed inconceivable. But take notice! This 
is not to say that it cannot be thought about. 
This “cannot” means that one cannot use the conceptual mind. If one uses ordinary 
knowledge or thinking to force a logical idea of the Dao, this is completely wrong. If the 
Dharmakaya can be attained through conceptualizing, this still falls within the 
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boundaries of false thinking. Therefore, it is said that it cannot be reached through 
thought, but that is not to say that one can’t think about it. It must be attested to through 
realization and not merely through thinking about it.xvi 
 
The above text is exciting yet confusing. Mainly there are three points: Dao cannot be 
achieved by logical thinking and experience gathering, and it can only be achieved through 
realization. The seeking of Dao doesn't involve conceptualizing, which, in Western epistemology, 
is an essential step to truth. Thoughts cannot reach Dao, but people can still think about it. 
Since achieving Dao is the result when you reach the third stage, we know that this 
activity requires a cognitive jump, as we discussed in the previous section. Logical thinking and 
experience are still things and techniques in the second stage, so you cannot use logic and 
experience to break the limits of the second stage. So going to the third stage requires a particular 
type of technique that is different from those from the second stage: epiphany. 
Since logical thinking is not a thing in the process, there is also no place for 
conceptualizing. If we use the word “Concept” in a Fregean sense, which we discussed in the 
term definition section, the way to achieve Dao cannot be achieved using logic and abstract 
objects. Conceptualizing is still a technique we use to analyze problems in the second stage. 
When we first encounter philosophical problems, the first thing we do is to give an abstract 
definition about the subject we are discussing the then use logic to solve the problem. This 
traditional Western Epistemology technique will have no use in achieving Dao. 
The first two points are all discussed in the comparison of the three stages. However, the 
last point, which is that Dao cannot be reached by thoughts, is new. We do touch a little bit on 
the topic of unsayable things, but right now we are going to look at the problem further. What 
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does it mean to say that something that cannot be reached by thought, but we can still think about 
it, and how is this idea connected to something that cannot be said? 
 
A Wittgensteinian answer: 
 
Luckily and also surprisingly, Wittgenstein, the man who had never encountered a Zen 
master, gave a logical possibility for something that can be thought about but cannot be 
expressed in words in the Blue Book, and I will explain the idea below: 
 
If I give someone the order "fetch me a red flower from that meadow", how is he to know 
what sort of flower to bring, as I have only given him a word? 
 
Wittgenstein is trying to show us an idea of how words can serve to convey an instruction. 
The example might not seem to relate to anything Dao is pursuing, but later the example will 
open up the idea about what word cannot do for us when it comes to communication. The 
discussion goes on: 
 
Now the answer one might suggest first is that he went to look for a red flower carrying a 
red image in his mind, and comparing it with the flowers to see which of them had the 
color of the image. Now there is such a way of searching, and it is not at all essential that 
the image we use should be a mental one. In fact the process may be this: I carry a chart 
coordinating names and colored squares. When I hear the order "fetch me etc." I draw 
my finger across the chart from the word "red" to a certain square, and I go and look for 
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a flower which has the same color as the square. But this is not the only way of searching 
and it isn't the usual way. We go, look about us, walk up to a flower and pick it, without 
comparing it to anything. To see that the process of obeying the order can be of this kind, 
consider the order "imagine a red patch". You are not tempted in this case to think that 
before obeying you must have imagined a red patch to serve you as a pattern for the red 
patch which you were ordered to imagine. 
 
Wittgenstein then brought up an idea about how we commonly answer the question 
above. When we are trying to understand the meaning of a word, we have some kind of mental 
image or mental representation of the thing, and then we link the word to that thing. In this 
example, to understand the meaning of “red,” we have a mental image of a “red” square, and we 
link the square to the color “red.” 
However, Wittgenstein pointed out the problem of the argument. If the idea is right, then 
we need to image a red patch before we imaged a red patch. To find the red patch to imagine, we 
need first to call up the red patch. And that process seems ridiculous since you cannot imagine 
something before you are supposed to image it.  
 
Now you might ask: do we interpret the words before we obey the order? And in some 
cases you will find that you do something which might be called interpreting before 
obeying, in some cases not. 
It seems that there are certain definite mental processes bound up with the working of 
language, processes through which alone language can function. I mean the processes of 
understanding and meaning. The signs of our language seem dead without these mental 
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processes; and it might seem that the only function of the signs is to induce such 
processes, and that these are the things we ought really to be interested in. Thus, if you 
are asked what is the relation between a name and the thing it names, you will be 
inclined to answer that the relation is a psychological one, and perhaps when you say 
this you think in particular of the mechanism of association. —We are tempted to think 
that the action of language consists of two parts; an inorganic part, the handling of signs, 
and an organic part, which we may call understanding these signs, meaning them, 
interpreting them, thinking. These latter activities seem to take place in a queer kind of 
medium, the mind; and the mechanism of the mind, the nature of which, it seems, we don't 
quite understand, can bring about effects which no material mechanism could. Thus e.g. 
a thought (which is such a mental process) can agree or disagree with reality; I am able 
to think of a man who isn't present; I am able to imagine him, 'mean him' in a remark 
which I make about him, even if he is thousands of miles away or dead. "What a queer 
mechanism," one might say, "the mechanism of wishing must be if I can wish that which 
will never happen".xvii 
 
Then Wittgenstein goes on to discuss that there seem to be some mental processes other 
than the language or word that are used by us to interpret the meaning of words and to act on it. 
If we try to put into words everything we know when we say we understand the meaning of the 
word, we cannot do that since there are some other mental processes other than language existed 
and “bounded up with the working of language.”  
We are tempted to think that if we know a thing, then we should be able to articulate it 
using concepts, explain it using languages. But even in very simple cases, including knowing the 
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meanings of the color words, there is no way to put all of our understanding into words in a way 
that leaves no room for possible misinterpretations. This serves as an excellent argument that the 
same kind of thing Zen is talking about must be possible because we have examples of 
understanding-not-in-words that are indubitably real. 
 
The problems: 
 
The above analysis isn't enough for us to say that the epiphany process is valid. Merely 
thinking that there is something that is beyond thoughts doesn’t prove the truth value of epiphany. 
There are much more to consider.  
The first question is that if having an epiphany is supposed to be a way of acquiring 
knowledge, then what do you come to know?  What is your justification for believing it?  What 
reason do you have to think you have a “real” epiphany, and not just an illusion of an epiphany? 
The second question is that after you achieved the epiphany, how can you tell that you 
got the truth? A better question is that if two people who have reached epiphany want to test on 
the same person to see if he or she has achieved epiphany, will they arrive at the same conclusion? 
Is there any good reason to believe that different people who have epiphanies are becoming 
aware of the same thing?  How can someone (for example a Zen master) test someone else (for 
example, one of their students) to see whether they have had an epiphany?   
 
 
An answer: 
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Wittgenstein offered us some ways to solve the problem. If we go back to the colored 
words example, it is pretty clear that we can directly test whether or not the person indeed goes 
through epiphany. You can ask the person to fetch a red flower and see if he or she finds the 
right one. However, this won’t be absolute proof since it might just be a lucky guess that the guy 
just randomly selects a flower and it is red. But still, tests of this kind will be a good indicator to 
determine whether or not the guy finds the solution. 
Wittgenstein also gave us a similar example in his later work Philosophical investigation: 
 
143. Let us now examine the following kind of language-game: when A gives an order B 
has to write down series of signs according to a certain formation rule. 
The first of these series is meant to be that of the natural numbers in decimal notation. —
How does he get to understand this notation? — First of all series of numbers will be 
written down for him and he will be required to copy them. (Do not balk at the expression 
"series of numbers"; it is not being used wrongly here.) And here already there is a 
normal and an abnormal learner's reaction. —At first perhaps we guide his hand in 
writing out the series 0 to 9; but then the possibility of getting him to understand will 
depend on his going on to write it down independently. —And here we can imagine, e.g., 
that he does copy the figures independently, but not in the right order: he writes 
sometimes one sometimes another at random. And then communication stops at that point. 
—Or again, he makes 'mistakes". 
What we have to mention in order to explain the significance, I mean the importance, of a 
concept, are often extremely general facts of nature: such facts as are hardly ever 
mentioned because of their great generality. in the order. —The difference between this 
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and the first case will of course be one of frequency. —Or he makes a systematic mistake; 
for example, he copies every other number, or he copies the series 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, .... like 
this: 1, o, 3, 2, 5, 4, …. Here we shall almost be tempted to say that he has understood 
wrong. 
  
191. "It is as if we could grasp the whole use of the word in a flash.” …xviii 
 
In the passage, Wittgenstein gave us a similar example that seems to involve an epiphany 
process. A teacher is trying to teach a student to write a series of numbers and the way to show 
the student is to write the series down and let the student copy them. And then the way to test it 
is to ask the student to “write it down independently.” The way we get what the series of 
numbers to write down is not through the teacher’s teaching about why we should write in this 
way, but through we "grasping the idea in a flash.” So can the epiphany process in Zen be tested 
in the same way as the examples of Wittgenstein? Can the result after the epiphany process be 
tested in some actionable form? 
The key here is to find a scenario that an already-enlightened person is judging whether 
other people achieved enlightenment or not. And luckily, we have found it. It is one of the most 
well-known Ch’an stories about how Hui Neng became the Sixth Patriarch: 
 
His Holiness Hui Neng, who became the great Sixth Patriarch of Ch'an was a poor 
illiterate peasant boy from Hsin Chou of Kwangtung. He later got a chance to meet the 
Fifth Zen Patriarch, Hung Jen, at the Tung Chian Monastery in the Huang Mei District 
of Chi Chou and Master Hung Jen accepted him as his disciple.  
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One day the Fifth Patriarch told his monks to express their wisdom in a poem. Whoever 
had true realization of his original nature (Buddha Nature) would be ordained the Sixth 
Patriarch. The head monk, Shen Hsiu, was the most learned, and wrote the following: 
 
The body is a Bodhi tree, 
The mind like a bright mirror stand. 
Time and again brush it clean, 
And let no dust alight. 
 
The poem was praised, but The Fifth Patriarch knew that Shen Hsiu had not yet found his 
original nature, on the other hand, Hui Neng couldn't even write, so someone had to 
write down his poem, which read: 
 
Originally Bodhi has no tree, 
The bright mirror has no stand. 
Originally there is not a single thing: 
Where can dust alight? 
 
The master then found he was truly enlightened and gave him the insignia of his office, 
the Patriarch's robe and bowl. xix 
 
This is the perfect story for our analysis. The Fifth Patriarch was someone who has 
achieved the Dao (The original nature or the Buddha Nature is referring to Dao), and he was 
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finding his successor, another person who found the Dao. The way he was judging it was to 
make it a competition and made people write poems, so he knew that by reading the poem, he 
was able to tell if someone had achieved the Dao or not. In the end, he did make a decision and 
genuinely thought that Hui Neng was the one who achieved the Dao. So based on the above 
analysis, we know that the way to achieve Dao is something that cannot be said, or we can make 
it similar by saying that why the Dao I am expressing or telling you is the case is something 
cannot be said. So I can tell you that you can see mountains are just mountains after achieving 
the Dao or I can tell you that the ultimate truth is emptiness (Which is the main point in the 
Heart Sutra, another famous Zen Texts). But I cannot tell you why that is the case. I can give 
you a red flower and tell you that it is red, but I cannot really tell you why that is red and not 
something else. I can show you how addition works, but I cannot tell you why that is the case. 
(Further than that, there doesn't exist a proof for 1+1=2, it is just something that is regarded 
correct for math) But, I can still test you about it. I can ask you to find a red flower for me and 
based on my understanding of the red flower I can make the judgment about whether you find 
the right one or not. I can ask you to calculate what 8+2 is and I will compare the number to my 
result. 
Similarly, I can ask you to show your understanding of Dao and compare it to my 
knowledge of Dao. The fact that I cannot show you doesn't mean I do not know what it is. The 
reason that the Fifth Patriarch chose Hui Neng was that his understanding resembled the 
understanding of The Fifth Patriarch.  
However, there was a possibility that Hui Neng just knew what the Dao was from The 
Fifth Patriarch (since you can tell what the Dao is) and made a similar poem. It is like you are 
asked to fetch a red flower with the experience that you have seen one and you find the one that 
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looks similar to the red flower you have seen. However, it is highly impossible in this case since 
making a poem has too many random variables and it is not something you can make by copying 
other people’s poem and make it seem original. Also, it is pretty hard to make a lucky guess and 
hit the jackpot since you are not selecting and the answers are infinite. So if I have already 
achieved the Dao, the way I am going to test others is to make them show me the Dao in an 
original “free response” approach: to tell a story, to make a poem, or do an act. It is similar to the 
scenario that a math teacher is trying to teach children how to calculate how many apples I have 
on both hands if I have one in left and one in the right after explaining the rules of additions. 
After he or she shows the student how to get the result two apples, the teacher can ask what if I 
have two in left and one in the right. The student, in this case, can still get the right answer even 
if he or she does not understand what is going on: he or she needs to do a similar thing by adding 
the number together, even though the student does not need to know why he or she should do so. 
However, if in this case, the teacher asks the student to calculate how many apples are on the 
chair and table when one on the table and one on the chair, then the student has to sort of know 
why he or she should add the number together to get the answer right.  
But a problem remains: how can the Fifth Patriarch know that his Dao was right? The 
way the Fifth Patriarch was sure that Hui Neng got the Dao was to compare them to his 
understanding. What if his understanding has initially been flawed? That would imply that Hui 
Neng’s answer was also defective. And in this case, the red flower and addition cannot offer 
much help since you can say that for all practical purposes, every normal human will agree that 
this flower is red, and that one plus one equals two. You cannot say the same thing about Dao 
since it will make the whole discussion senseless: “Why do you think you get the Dao?” 
“Because it is just universally true.” It is just not helpful. It seems that the only way out of this is 
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by saying that the Fifth Patriarch got it from the Patriarch before him and the chain will go to the 
start of all this: the first Buddha himself. And this is what the story told us: Hui Neng got 
enlightened before by the Diamond Sutra, and the Fifth Patriarch started to teach him more about 
the Sutra after the appointment, and Hui Neng thought the text resembled his understanding.xx 
The Diamond Sutra is the teaching of the Buddha. Asking whether the Buddha got the Dao is 
like asking whether Plato’s understanding about forms was right about Plato’s understanding 
about forms. The Buddha was the one who created the whole thing and the idea of Dao in the 
first place. Whether the Dao is the truth, however, is a different discussion.  
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Conclusion 
It seems that we have achieved a lot in this thesis. The primary purpose of it, as we stated 
in the introduction section, is to make an introduction to Zen Buddhist epistemology through a 
way that can be understood by Western epistemologist. We have shown what function does 
epiphany, which is the key of Zen epistemology, serves in the whole process of understanding 
the world. We have achieved that through the three stages and by comparing to Wittgenstein’s 
two three-stages structures, we can see that the process does have some truth in it since a well-
known Western Philosopher also came up with the same idea.  
We also looked into the details of the epiphany process. We first have the idea that there 
exists the similarity between Wittgenstein and Zen Buddhism that they both have the idea that 
something exists something that cannot be said and the thing is essential for some fundamental 
questions. We then use Wittgenstein’s texts to prove that there is the possibility that there exists 
some understanding that is beyond language. Then we look at an important question that is 
bothering Western epistemologists, which is if we achieve something that is beyond thought, 
then how can we be sure that we get something right? Later we solved the question by 
comparing Zen and Wittgenstein’s texts since they all involve the idea that although the result is 
achieved through unspeakable processes, we can still test on it, since the result of the test is 
speak-able or showable.  
However, this thesis is also limited. We can see that when studying the three-stage 
process, Wittgenstein and Zen seems to all conclude that a solipsism idea will eventually become 
realism. However, I am unable to explain either of them. It seems to be a critical issue why 
solipsism will coincide with realism, and the topic might need another thesis to explain. 
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There is also some further research idea generating from this topic. For example, an 
examination of the scope of epiphany needs to be analyzed. For Zen and Wittgenstein, epiphany 
is mainly for Dao and the meaning of life. However, achieving those are not the end, and there is 
a possibility that we need to use that to solve some real-world questions. The question that can 
we derive some sayable thoughts from some unsayable understandings is essential and can be of 
great use if proven right. 
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